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Others in the Making of Selves 
 
Roberta L. Coles 





The Self has received renewed attention across disciplines in recent 
years. Scholars have analyzed, psychoanalyzed, discovered, named, 
and narrated a plethora of selves. There are dialogic selves (Bakhtin 
1981; Fand 1999), playing selves (Melucci 1996), redemptive selves 
(McAdams 2006), emotionally managed selves (Hochschild 1983), 
muscled selves (Sparkes et al. 2005), mediated selves (Sawrey 2005), 
saturated selves (Gergen 1991), extended selves (Eakin 2004), night 
and day selves (Fand 1999), embodied selves (Sacks 1985), ad 
infinitum. [For a good overview of more Selves than you can shake a 
stick at, see Holstein & Gubrium (2000).]  
 
Even within a single individual a multiplicity of subjectivities can 
and, it is frequently advocated, should co-exist. A complex society 
exists within the individual. Hence, any sense of privacy we cling to 
can only be a figment of false consciousness; with multiple selves, we 
are never alone. Enjoying one’s own company is akin to standing in 
the middle of Grand Central Station. An apparent monologue is no less 
than a colloquium. Even the most private self-masturbatory act 
becomes an orgy.  
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In this rush to propagate and pander to Selves, the Other has 
been overlooked. As frequently occurs, those at the forefront of fame 
and fortune neglect to acknowledge those along the way who helped 
them become who they are today. Ironically so, because it is difficult, 
if not impossible, for a Self to exist without an Other.1 As sociologist 
Peter Berger asserts (1963:98-9), “identity is socially bestowed, 
socially sustained, and socially transformed….taking the role of the 
other is decisive for the formation of the self.” One way or another, 
“the Other” plays a major role in how the self is formulated, enlivened, 
and embodied in life and in academic discourse.  
 
This paper traverses the diverse roles assigned to the Other in 
various academic treatises on the Self. I do not offer a typology or 
exhaustive catalog of roles that the Other might play, but rather I 
show how the Other has been variously construed by unpacking the 
roles and responsibilities assigned to the Other in some influential 
texts of various disciplines and current research on the Self or Other 
over the past few decades. Neither do I attempt to advocate for a 
particular formulation of the Other, nor promote a specific version of 
the Other as especially useful or empirically viable. I am more 
interested in exploring the power and agency of the Other, and in 
discussing how the various dimensions and functions of the Other are 
consequential for interesting, important narratives about the social 
self. I suggest questions to guide future explorations into the abyss of 
the Other.  
 
An Assortment of Others  
 
Unfortunately, I am not the first to attempt to map out the 
narrative terrain of Others. In 1985 R. S. Perinbanayagam presented 
various social theorists’ conceptions of the Other in his book Signifying 
Acts: Structure and Meaning in Everyday Life. Basically, they comprise 
three Others: the Generalized Other, the Meiotic Other (my language), 
and the Significant Other. I will address three additional Others—the 
Unconscious Other, the Marginalized Other, and the Nonhuman Other-
-that I find in a broader and more recent literature. Although I group 
them into six main Others, the borders of these types are somewhat 
arbitrary, porous, and nondiscrete, as interaction and intersection exist 
among them. Two characteristics that distinguish one Other from 
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another are whether the Other exists within or outside the Self and 
whether the Other is an individual or aggregate entity. The 
Unconscious Other and the Generalized Other both are constructed 
from symbolic material outside the individual but ultimately take up 
residence within the Self. The Meiotic Self is the self divided; there 
may be multiple divisions but each Meiotic Self is usually presented as 
singly constituted. The Significant Other, an individual, and the 
Marginalized Other, often a status group or member of it, reside 
outside the Self but play supporting roles in relation to any particular 
Self, which may also be an individual or status group, such as men, 
Whites, and Americans. The Nonhuman Other may be individual, an 
aggregate of individuals or the product of human behavior, all of which 
reside outside the Self.  
 
The Unconscious Other. 
 
The Unconscious Other derives from psychoanalytic literature, 
particularly that of Jacques Lacan, who regrettably disguised his 
meaning of the “Other” in the verbal garments of at least five different 
conceptual costumes, the Unconscious being the main or 
encompassing one (Lemaire 1977; Socor 1997). Even devoted 
disciples of Lacan appear uncertain of the Other’s identity. Catherine 
Clement (1983), a student of Lacan’s, argues that the Other is the 
embodiment of the Unconscious, the Phallic Law, the Father, and 
functions as the repository of language and culture; she argues that 
these are all found in the same “location” within the Self. On the other 
hand, psychoanalytical scholar Wendy Hollway (1993) posits that the 
Lacanian Other is the Mother.  
 
In much psychoanalytic thought, the development of the Self 
and its Unconscious is correlated with the inauguration of the psychic 
drives of Desire, Lack, and Absence. These motivating states are 
precipitated by the bodily, and later the emotional, separation from 
the Mother, which create a lifelong unsatisfied Desire for reunion. 
Specifically, one of Lacan’s multiple Others is the signifier of the 
Mother, or more precisely, the signifier of unlimited enjoyment of and 
union with the mother’s body, known as “jouissance” in Lacan’s 
theory. Lacan placed a slash or bar through his symbol for Mother-
Other to indicate the prohibition of unlimited access to and enjoyment 
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of the mother (Glowinski et al. 2001). In both Freud and Lacan, the 
source of prohibition is the father, and fear of his jealous wrath results 
in the infamous castration complex.  
 
Freud argues that without the castration complex one cannot 
fully experience sexual desire, as it is only the prohibition of the 
incestual object (mom) that forces one to seek enjoyment in a 
nonincestual object. It is this Lack of the primordial Mother that 
inaugurates Desire and drives the subject to search elsewhere for what 
it lacks (Glowinski et al 2001). From then on, according to Lacan, all 
human desire is the desire of the Other (Lacan 1977[1959]: 58); that 
is, the first object of desire is to be recognized--needed, loved, 
admired, valued, acknowledged--by the Other (Bracher 1995). 
 
While Freud first posited the Unconscious as a repository of the 
images, sounds and emotions available to and repressed by the child 
during the first six months or so of its life, Lacan introduced language 
as a central factor in the formation of the Unconscious (Peters 1993). 
The child moves from an imaginary to a symbolic register with the 
acquisition of language through interaction with Others.  
 
The role of language in the formation of the Unconscious is not 
unrelated to the initiation of Desire through the castration complex 
just described. Lacan’s addition of language and symbolization 
presupposes that all systems of representation are based on Absence, 
echoing the primal loss of the mother (Siegal 1999). Humans must use 
words, signifiers, to communicate. By definition, the signifier is never 
the signified thing itself, so there results an incongruence, a 
dissatisfying lack or absence of the thing itself. Language, like the 
prohibitive castration complex, separates the subject from the full 
enjoyment of union with the primordial Other. Language, then, 
becomes a fence, a moat, between the Conscious and the 
Unconscious.  
 
It is this constant yearning for what is not there, this enduring 
sense of incompleteness and separation that, according to Socor 
(1997: 184), stimulates awareness of the Self. Desire, “the 
experiential affirmation of absence,” gives birth to the I, and one may 
imagine…that the first utterance of I is more closely characterized as ‘I 
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desire’.” In this psychoanalytical shell game, Lacan’s “I desire; 
therefore, I am” replaces the Cartesian “I think; therefore, I am.”  
 
The Unconscious becomes the repository for forbidden desires 
and signifiers, which become inaccessible to the volitional Self. In a 
sense then, the Self represents what is there and the Unconscious 
represents what is not there, what is absent, what is lacking. Socor 
(1997:7) suggests that the Unconscious Other is the “absent made 
present;” “[T]he Other speaks this absence which (unconsciously) 
controls us….The Other is the absent guest at the table of 
consciousness.” Therefore, one of Lacan’s famous dicta is that the 
“unconscious is the discourse of the Other.” 
 
The Generalized Other  
 
The Generalized Other is the sociological counterpart to 
psychology’s Unconscious Other. Analogous to Freud’s superego in his 
Holy Trinity of the id, ego and superego, social psychologist G.H. 
Mead’s ([1934] 1964) concept of the Generalized Other is the 
repository of societal norms. According to Perinbanayagam (1985) 
interpretation, the Generalized Other is the social-psychological form 
of the abstraction that sociologists and anthropologists call ‘social 
structure.’ Like Lacan’s Unconscious Other, the Generalized Other is 
formed through social interaction and therefore reflects historical and 
cultural maleability; it is not inherent within the individual. “The 
organized community or social group which gives to the individual his 
unity of self may be called ‘the generalized other.’ The attitude of the 
generalized other is the attitude of the whole community” (1964: 
218).  
 
Mead uses the concept of a game to illustrate. In a game, the 
individual must understand and enact the roles of all others involved in 
the game and comprehend the rules that condition the various roles 
(Mead [1934] 1964). These roles-organized-by-rules coalesce into a 
symbolic unity, the Generalized Other, mirroring the values and 
attitudes of a particular society, which becomes internalized into what 
Mead refers to as the “Me” (as opposed to the “I”) part of the Self. 
Thus, the Generalized Other embeds society within the individual Self, 
acting as a normative template, guide, and constraint on the Self.  
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Unlike the singular Unconscious Other, an individual may have 
multiple Generalized Others because the individual can hold 
membership in multiple “societies,” such as an organization, a status 
group, family, tribe or nation, each having its own attitudes, values 
and expected behaviors. These Generalized Others may conflict with 
one another, and the Self must negotiate among them.  
 
The Significant Other.  
 
This is perhaps the simplest and most straightforward Other of 
those proffered here, and it is most frequently addressed in the 
literature on “relational Selves” or “dialogic Selves.” There can be as 
many Significant Others as, but not more than, there are embodied 
individuals. The Significant Other is, for lack of a better term, a “real” 
person, possibly a family member, partner, friend, therapist, or any 
number of people with whom a Self comes into contact. Various 
terminologies have been employed in the literature to distinguish the 
degrees of significance Significant Others carry in relationship to a 
Self. Perinbanayagam (2000) designates “Interactional” and 
“Significant” Others in any particular instance of social interaction. The 
former is the person with whom one happens to be interacting, so 
essentially this person may be an insignificant other. Perinbanayagam 
reserves the term Significant Other for those who may or may not be 
physically present in the interaction, but who nevertheless play a 
significant role in a Self’s life and can influence the Self from afar. In 
an analysis of autobiographies, literary scholar Paul Eakin’s (1990:86) 
equivalent of Perinbanayagam’s Significant Other is called the 
“proximate other.” Eakin says the “most common form of the 
relational life [is] the self’s story viewed through the lens of its relation 
with some key other person, sometimes a sibling, friend, or lover, but 
most often a parent—we might call such an individual the proximate 
other to signify the intimate tie to the relational autobiographer.”  
 
It follows then that the Significant Other is often approached as 
one Self in a dyadic relationship with another Self, where one Self is 
the focus and the other is, at least temporarily, playing a supportive 
role. Philosopher Martin Buber’s ([1923] 1958) formulation of I and 
Thou, a largely egalitarian and mutual relationship that he placed in 
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opposition to the I-It relationship, which was one of subject-object, is 
illustrative of this. Buber thought the individual, as a fundamentally 
relational being, has an innate yearning for connection with others. 
Buber’s presumption that social interaction constitutes a necessary 
condition for the development of a whole person is, as you may recall, 
not unlike Lacan and Mead above. In all three, it is the developing 
child’s dyadic interplay with familial Significant Others that precipitates 
the emergence of a soul (Buber), an Unconscious (Lacan), and a 
Meiotic Self (Mead). However, it is the symbolic interaction with 
multiple Significant Others, a community of Others, sometimes 
referred to as a “primary group” (Cooley 1962), that gives rise to 
Mead’s Generalized Other. 
 
The Meiotic Self.  
 
In Mead’s formulation of a very socially-founded Self, the Self is 
composed of an “I,” the active, creative aspect of the Self that 
responds to the “Me,” the part of the Self that eventually internalizes 
the Generalized Other(s) and represents the self-image people form as 
they see themselves reflected in the actions and reactions of others 
toward them. The Self cannot come into being without this division, 
that is, without the objectification of the Self, the attempt to view 
oneself from the standpoint of others. The Me and the I then carry on 
a spiraling dialogue—the Me reflecting the Generalized Other and the I 
creatively responding—through which the individual’s choices and 
behaviors are conditioned but not determined.  
 
This concept of the splitting of the Self is an essential element of 
most psychoanalytical thought as well (Socor 1997). Lacan, for 
instance, proposed a “mirror stage” of development, a pre-linguistic 
phase in which the infant becomes capable of a self-reflective stance; 
it is the transition from experiencing one’s “self” as fragmented, 
partial, and segmented, to being able to view one’s self as an integral 
object (Weiner & Rosenwald 1993). According to such thought, the 
meiotic process occurs, in a psychologically healthy individual, during 
early childhood without much effort on the part of the individual. I 
refer to this initial, mostly involuntary, division of the self into two 
essential parts as the basal Meiotic Self. However, a number of 
scholars acknowledge the Self’s ability to divide into multiple selves. 
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One could legitimately argue that the voices of these Selves are 
merely the voices of the Generalized Others and the Significant Others 
pertinent to a particular Self, but in the literature they are treated as 
their own entities. I divide these potential divisions into three types: 
reflexivity, mind-body split, and a self-protective split.  
 
Many scholars of the self refer to the first type of split-self as a 
“condition of reflexivity,” or as Mead (1964) would say, the ability to 
take oneself as an object. Roger Bromley (2000) defines reflexivity as 
the ability to relate to oneself externally and to recover that 
continuously “othered” self. Linde (1993) argues that without the 
property of reflexivity a self is not a fully functioning social self. The 
Self should be able to, in a sense, stand aside and ask itself “How am I 
doing?” as an observer of its own life. Assuming that people desire a 
good self, or one that is perceived as good by others, Linde 
(1993:121) suggests that “reflexivity requires the narrator to separate 
him- or herself from the protagonist of his or her narrative in order to 
observe, reflect upon, and correct the self that is being created.” This 
is not unlike the self-therapy that most people do when they assume a 
self-observatory role to discuss (within themselves or aloud while 
driving in the car) the costs and benefits of a potential decision or to 
rehash an experience to achieve a sensible account.  
 
Whereas a reflexive Self is a daily occurrence among healthy 
Selves, some splits feel more imposed upon the Self by life’s traumas 
or employed reluctantly by the Self as a mechanism to cope with 
trauma. Various life disruptions can lead to the experience of oneself 
as “the Other.” This can be a mind-body or spirit-flesh division or one 
in which the Self essentially amputates a part of itself for protective 
purposes. For instance, upon the occurrence of a physical disruption, 
such as disability or ill health, people often experience the body as an 
“Other,” a stranger to one’s Self. As if in dissent, the body refuses to 
move in synchronization with one’s mental commands or with 
effortless ease. With such incongruity, the unity of body and Self can 
no longer be taken for granted. Or, occasionally the company of 
certain individuals or situations compels us to divide the Self as a 
protective strategy. Sennett & Cobb (1972), for instance, discuss how 
an alienated worker might “divide” him- or herself so that only part of 
his/her Self is subjected to humiliation; only one part is “othered.” 
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“Dividing the self defends against the pain a person would otherwise 
feel, if he had to submit the whole of himself to a society which makes 
his position a vulnerable and anxiety-laden one” (1972:208). Similarly, 
in the film A Thousand Acres, based on Jane Smiley’s 1991 book of the 
same name, a story about incest, the eldest daughter recounts that 
each time her father came to her in the night, she separated her Self 
from her body so that he was only raping a soulless shell. As medical 
anthropologist Gay Becker (1997) has noted, deep discomfort, even 
agony, can accompany such compulsory partition of the Self.  
 
The Marginalized Other 
 
The Marginalized Other (my terminology) is the Other whose 
identification and utilization is of most recent currency. Whereas the 
Generalized Other and Significant Other were generally conceived as 
having similar structures and qualities as the Self (indeed because 
they bestow some of their own content to the Self), the Marginalized 
Other is mostly about difference or ambiguity of one degree or 
another. Usually the difference has a negative connotation, but 
sometimes a romanticized one, such as in Elliot Gaines’ (2005) 
exploration of the notion of India as an “exotic other,” one that seems 
to exhibit exciting and fascinating, but still unusual, qualities.  
 
At one end of this difference continuum is the person or group 
that represents a standard deviation from the mean or that lacks 
sufficient clout or legitimacy to warrant being named specifically, as in 
“Christians, Jews and others,” or “apples, bananas, and other fruit.” 
The named groups represent the center (or the Self), while the 
unnamed reside at the cultural, sometimes also the societal, 
periphery. Sometimes the Marginalized Other reflects an ambiguous 
status, when it is not clear what its status is or in which extant 
category it should reside. For instance, Maria Root (1999) speaks of bi- 
or multiracial persons as Others because they don’t fit into presumably 
discrete racial categories.  
 
At the other end, the Marginalized Other is frequently 
constructed as the binary opposite of the Center. As the Self 
constructs itself, it seeks to distinguish itself from others; in so doing, 
it essentially constructs the Other with the remnants or undesirable 
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elements of cultural material. In Berglund’s (1994) words, 
Marginalized Others are “those persons negatively constructed in the 
dominant symbolic order.” Hence, essentially the Other embodies the 
slough of the dominant center’s character. They become dummy 
variables, so to speak; that is, women are the “not-males,” people of 
color the “non-Whites,” and immigrants the “not-Americans.” Literary 
theorist Terry Eagleton (1983: 132) thus writes:  
 
Woman is the opposite, the “other” of man; she is non-
man, defective man, assigned a chiefly negative value in 
relation to the male first principle. But equally man is what he is 
only by virtue of ceaselessly shutting out his other or opposite, 
defining himself in antithesis to it, and his whole identity is 
therefore caught up and put at risk in the very gesture by which 
he seeks to assert his unique, autonomous existence.  
 
Ghassan Hage (2005) similarly discusses the Lebanese 
Maronites’ othering of the Druze religious minority. Hage describes the 
process of othering the Druze in such a way that it conjures the 
psychoanalytic image of the creation of the repressed Unconscious 
(the not-Conscious).  
 
[The Maronites] start thinking of wretched people, hewers 
of wood, etc. That is, they invoke and collapse the other into the 
very class images that they have banished from their definition 
of themselves and their white people. Likewise with skin colour: 
one systematically represses the whiteness of the other and the 
non-whiteness within the self to end up with a white self and a 
non-white other….This also shows how, through this selective 
aestheticiszation, racialized thought manages to create a sense 
of absolute difference between self and other (p. 202).  
 
In this sense, individuals and groups are “othered,” (a verb 
connoting objectification and powerlessness of Others). They are 
defined in such a way that they are pushed to, or just beyond, the 
perimeters of cultural spaces, where they reside on the subordinate 
side of power dyads. If they are particularly unlucky, they may be 
doubly or trebly othered (Zaborowska, 1995); that is, if they are, 
perhaps, women of color, or Muslim and disabled, or—heaven forbid--
an aged, lesbian cult member. The subordinate and unclear status of 
these Others buttresses the dominant place of the Self and Center in a 
culture’s common sense (Nelson 2001).  
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The Nonhuman Other  
 
Nonhuman Others is a very recent idea, at least to the extent 
that it is garnering any utility, and it remains a largely undeveloped 
concept relative to the other Others. Generally, what is meant by this 
term “nonhuman others” are nonhuman animals. The (non-natural 
science) literature on the social aspect of animals is growing rapidly, 
but it is also quickly shifting to a literature of the Self. While some 
scholars are attempting to define animals as “subjective Others” 
(Irvine 2004) or “nonverbal Others” (Sanders & Arluke 1993), other 
scholars (Alger & Alger 1997) are more interested in establishing a 
Self for animals.  
 
However, the possibility of nonhuman others has been attended 
to in the past as well. In Buber’s (1957) I-Thou relationship, two of the 
possible Thous are abstract symbolic systems, such as books and art, 
and nature. One could argue that the former is the product of humans 
and, therefore, does not count as a Nonhuman Other, but nature 
would embody animals, plants, and perhaps inanimate (though often 
formerly animate) objects, such as soil, rock, or water. According to 
Buber, nature and symbolic systems are Thous in the sense that 
Selves are capable of receiving confirmation through them. This gives 
rise to the possibility that inanimate nonnatural objects, such as toys, 
might be Others as well. As will be discussed below, the Wilson ball in 
the film “The Castaway” (or the inflatable Bianca in the film “Lars and 
the Real Girl”) would fall into this category.  
 
Issues of Power: Territorial Boundaries and 
Agency & Resistance  
 
The necessity of the Others’ existence for the development of a 
healthy Self bestows on Others an inherent, though frequently 
unrecognized and unrealized, power. Although virtually any reference 
to Self and Other privileges the Self over the Other, early conceptions 
of the Other found in G.H. Mead, Alfred Schutz, and Charles Cooley, 
for instance, painted Others that were largely benevolently agentic2; 
after all, these Others were often familial or friendly Significant Others 
(primary groups) and distillations of group attitudes (Generalized 
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Others) that reflected a neat Durkheimian consensus that acted as 
guides to emerging Selves. While such conceptions were not ignorant 
of conflicts between and within Selves and Others, many of these 
conceptions seemed to gloss over the internecine struggles that can 
occur in the formulation of Self and Other. Today those struggles have 
risen to the forefront with the focus on Marginalized Others. 
 
Positioning theory (Harre & Moghaddam 2003) in psychology 
recognizes that the status of any particular Other may be situationally 
relative and is conferred by the Self through numerous strategies, 
such as address and naming (Perinbanayagam 2000), distribution of 
resources, and the creation of standards and rules. But, ultimately, the 
ongoing creation of Selves and Others, and their continuous interplay, 
is inevitably about power and influence. It is a tussle over the content 
and quality of Selves and Others and over position—not only in regard 
to who’s on top of a hierarchy or who gets to be the protagonist, but 
also over cultural territory, where lines are drawn in cultural sands, 
fences make good neighbors, and borders serve as both battlegrounds 
and locations for liaisons.  
 
Borders & Boundaries  
 
To preface the discussion about agency and power, one must 
discuss boundaries and borders, as they are inherent to one degree or 
another in the relationship of Self and Other. To do so, we must return 
to psychoanalytic literature, in which the subject separates physically, 
psychologically, and eternally from the mother. In doing so, ego-
boundaries are formed. While most psychoanalytic literature 
recognizes the necessary relational role of Others in the development 
of the Self, psychic health is assumed to be accompanied by some 
degree of separateness from others; in a healthy individual the 
boundaries between “Self” and “Other” should be carefully 
circumscribed.  
 
Boundaries are most often discussed in the context of 
Significant Others and Marginalized Others. Women, for instance, are 
frequently said to exhibit ill-defined, porous ego boundaries. 
Psychoanalyst Nancy Chodorow (1978) explains that the female’s 
separation from the mother is characterized by greater ambivalence 
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and confusion over ego boundaries than is the parallel process for 
males. From this, it is then often concluded that women tend to have 
more trouble maintaining healthy ego boundaries; they become too 
easily embedded in others’ lives and identities. Their own needs get 
lost in the needs of others. Although speaking without reference to 
gender, sociologist Arlie Hochschild (1983) describes the “other-
directed” false self, the altruist, as the person who is overly concerned 
with the needs of others. When overdeveloped, this false, altruistic self 
oversteps its boundaries, bonding its true self to the group’s welfare 
[italics mine].3 Occasionally, this ability to penetrate boundaries is 
comprehended as a positive quality, even in women, as it is argued, 
for instance, that because of their porous boundaries women can 
incorporate Otherness more easily than can men.  
 
Despite the supposition that boundaries between Self and 
Others are essential to healthy personality development and perhaps 
to social relationships, some scholars recognize that the Desire of the 
Other simultaneously wars with these erected boundaries. Buber 
([1923] 1958), Joas (1998), and others assert that the Self seeks 
fusion--sexually, spiritually—with Others and can only experience that 
fusion by transgressing the boundaries of the Self. According to Italian 
sociologist Alberto Melucci (1996), the apparent differences between 
Self and Other, which are constructed and delineated by discrete 
borders, entice and seduce us to cross over. Yet the Self fears the loss 
of identity that might accompany the penetration of borders.  
 
[E]ncountering another always entails putting into 
question something of ourselves and of our uniqueness and 
venturing into an unknown land only to discover what we lack: 
exposing oneself to otherness implies a challenge to one’s self-
sufficiency and the recognition that the other is different 
precisely because s/he possesses what we do not have… (pp. 
101-2)  
 
The psychological lingo of boundaries often converts to 
“margins” and “peripheries” when discussing subordinate Marginalized 
Others or to “borders” when Marginalized Others are afforded (or 
assume) increased power and agency. Most of the time, residing on or 
beyond the border of mainstream society is a precarious, peripheral 
position. For instance, Lisa Park (2005) describes the border location 
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of Asian Americans, who as a “model minority” ride the border 
between the White Americans at the Center and “bad minorities” in the 
outlying cultural territory. Park says,  
 
Asian Americans find themselves standing on a “fault line,” 
vulnerable to the slightest quake or change in social boundaries 
between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Their social role as a mythical model 
minority requires that they continuously exhibit their patriotism 
or their deservingness of social citizenship through consumptive 
displays. Otherwise, they may fall into the “bad” immigrant 
category and experience even greater limitations on their social 
citizenship claims (p. 12).  
 
However, it has also been argued that such a border position 
provides, perhaps as a consolation prize (as with the meek who 
eventually inherit the earth), some double-edged characteristics that 
can be construed as forms of power for Marginalized Others. In this 
case, being “othered” supposedly supplies Marginalized Others with 
keen insight and cultural knowledge unavailable to the Center. 
Surviving in and successfully negotiating the Self’s or Center’s world 
requires Marginalized Others to make intelligence-gathering forays 
across the border, thus rendering them more familiar with and skilled 
in negotiating both domains. The Center, on the other hand, can 
maintain its dominance even while lacking such knowledge, that is, 
while lacking understanding of the Other, the capability of seeing 
oneself as the Other, and the illumination that that capability would 
afford (Becker 1997).  
 
Likewise, because of their contrast (difference) and their 
sashaying back and forth across cultural borders, Marginalized Others 
create “boundary moments,” which are, as defined by Stephen Knadler 
(2002: xvii), “moments of disruption when people become conscious of 
their membership in a…group because of their experience of rejection 
or counteridentification by a member of another group.” Michael 
Holquist (1999: 101) argues that “the mind is structured so that the 
world is always perceived according to contrast.” Nothing can be 
perceived except against the perspective of something else; there is 
no figure without a background. It is only in those moments of 
contrasting disruption that we see who we “really” are, that we see the 
nuances of our identity, as when one holds a “white” paint chip against 
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a piece of white paper, only to discover the “white” paint chip is 
actually a pale shade of blue.  
 
On the other hand, because racial ethnic minority groups and 
women must be experienced in both worlds, it is occasionally argued 
that they themselves are divided, possessing a double consciousness, 
which can have negative or positive consequences for themselves or 
others. W.E.B. Du Bois ([1903] 1979), in The Souls of Black Folk, 
argued that the African American had no true self-consciousness.  
 
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense 
of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of 
measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in 
amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness,--an 
American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled 
strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged 
strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder” (p. 3).  
 
Brownley & Kimmich (1999) argue that women autobiographers 
are likewise double voiced, because they view themselves in two 
dramatically different ways—first through the eyes of society as the 
stereotypical feminine object but then also in ways that conflict with 
the constraining stereotype. Being doubly conscious or doubly voiced 
(read also: forked tongue) can lead to a double life, which may include 
an element of duplicity manifested in various forms. Prime examples 
would be Black people passing for whites, literally, or as “oreos” and 
women deceiving men, particularly in the arena of orgasms (Forrester 
1997).  
 
Agentic Others  
 
The most agentic Other is the Significant Other, which plays a 
strong and creative role in a Self’s initial and continuous identity 
formation. At minimum, the Self’s identity is a collaborative, relational 
effort with Significant Others. Paul Eakin (1990:63) suggests that we 
learn how to be a certain kind of person in conversation with others; 
that is, identity formation is socially and discursively transacted. 
Likewise, sociologist Erving Goffman ([1956] 1967:84-85) argued that 
a person’s constituent personal and social identities cannot be realized 
in isolation:  
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Rather the individual must rely on others to complete the 
picture of him of which he himself is allowed to paint only 
certain parts….While it may be true that the individual has a 
unique self all his own, evidence of that possession is thoroughly 
a product of joint ceremonial labor.  
 
In a person’s earliest developmental stage, the Significant Other 
plays a pivotal role, both in the formation of the Self and in the 
formation of that Self’s Others. Without the verbal and nonverbal 
interaction between Significant Others, particularly parents, and a 
child, the Generalized Other and the basal Meiotic Self would not form. 
As the circle of Significant Others expands in the life of a Self, the 
Generalized Other is formed and wends its way into the Me. Finally, 
the number and content of our multiple Selves are constrained and 
shaped by what “closely enmeshed others accord” (Goffman 
1971:367).  
 
While the Significant Other is usually viewed as using its agency 
benevolently, it clearly has the potential to exercise varying levels of 
control over the Self’s creation. As Jenkins (2000) points out, we know 
who we are because Others tell us. Narrative scholar Randall (1995) 
says Others story us. The stories Others tell about us, which Randall 
calls “outside-in stories,” help to create the social climate in which our 
lives are lived and to determine the range of options and opportunities 
by which our lives are bound. In fact, a Significant Other can speak on 
behalf of the Self. This is most obvious in the case of children, who are 
still developing their own selves, their own voices, and have little 
control over their environment. As Steedman (quoted in Eakin 1990) 
asserts, “children are always episodes in someone else’s narrative.” 
Glowinski et al. (2001) suggests that even the infant’s cry is 
interpreted by Significant Others as speech, as when the parent 
responds to the infant’s cry with the explanation “Oh, he wants his 
diaper changed.” Cahill (1998) takes the parents’ identity-conferring 
role one step back, acknowledging that even prior to birth, parents, 
abetted by ultrasound technology and genetic tests, labor in the 
production of their offsprings’ identities. For instance, parents of an 
active fetus might jumpstart their child’s identity with statements such 
as “He’s already a strong kicker.” In return, family and friends may 
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find evidence of the parents’ announced identity in the infant’s later 
conduct and treat him or her accordingly. 
 
In some cases, Significant Others may seize the opportunity to 
control an adult’s identity when s/he lacks the means to control his/her 
own identity. Cahill (1998) and Holstein & Gubrium (2000) proffer 
examples of the strong role Significant Others play in the production of 
Selves for disabled people or persons with Alzheimer’s Disease. One 
might refer to the recent case of Terry Schiavo, a wife comatose for 13 
years. Although her autopsy revealed her to be brain dead, Schiavo’s 
parents and brother had successfully created a vital public persona on 
her behalf. One might consider who Terry Schiavo would have been if 
a less interested party had been responsible for her care. In these 
latter cases, the person contributes little of his/her own labor to the 
creation of its Self. It is this ability of some Others that begs the 
question “Who is the Other here?” Is the Self just a vessel for the 
Other in these cases?  
 
In essence then, the relationship between the Self and 
Significant Other can become a battlefield over who gets to be Self and 
Other in each dyadic relational instance and over the content of the 
identity each Self will be allowed to have. It is this element of 
interpersonal struggle, which can be subtle or overt, that is often 
missing when scholars describe the process of narrating or making a 
Self. For instance, “Self A” may have a particular image of his or her 
Self, while Significant Others B through E have different images of that 
person or at least Self A suspects that they do. Self A needs their 
feedback to try to assess which, if any, of those Selves are “really” 
hers, but directly asking for the feedback is risky and appears self-
absorbed. Frequently, even if asked, Others withhold their feedback 
from Self A, though they may freely tell other bystanders what they 
think of Self A. Perhaps it is not their intent to keep Self A incomplete; 
maybe they intend only to protect themselves in some way, but the 
outcome is that their withholding makes Self A’s self-creation more 
uncertain. Illustrative of this function is Crooks, the black farmhand in 
Steinbeck’s Of Mice and Men ([1937] 1979). As the only Black 
farmhand, Crooks [who is described (p.299) as a man who “had 
reduced himself to nothing. There was no personality, no ego….,”] 
resides in a separate shack, isolated from the white farmhands. 
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Lennie, the mentally retarded protagonist who has accidentally killed 
two people, suggests to Crooks that he come live with Lennie and his 
brother George when they finally buy the farm they’ve been saving 
for. Crooks thinks such a living arrangement might resolve the lack of 
certainty about his self-perceptions that accompanies his isolation. He 
states this in considerably less postmodern jargon:  
 
A guy sets alone out here at night, maybe readin’ books or 
thinkin’, an’ he got nothing to tell him what’s so an’ what ain’t 
so. Maybe if he sees somethin’, he don’t know whether it’s right 
or not. He can’t turn to some other guy and ast him if he sees it 
too. He can’t tell. He got nothing to measure by. I seen things 
out here. I wasn’t drunk. I don’t know if I was asleep. If some 
guy was with me, he could tell me I was asleep, an’ then it 
would be all right (p. 292).  
 
Occasionally, Others tell Self A what they think of him/her, and 
Self A may find the revelation shocking, and then a battle ensues. 
Person A must convince them that they are wrong, must persuade 
them to let her out of that particular identity box. A similar power 
struggle can occur among the Meiotic Selves, particularly when the 
division of the basal Self into multiple Selves is imposed by external 
exigencies. As McAdams (1993:115) asserts, the splitting of the self is 
occasionally a discordant one, as when one is afraid to let one set of 
his acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere. When there are 
multiple, particularly contradictory images, of a Self, one is left 
wondering which are the “real” or “faux” selves, much the way women 
feel in a clothing store’s dressing room, where multiple mirrors and 
unnatural lighting show the uneven terrain of one’s aging body from 
every angle. Like circus mirrors, some of the reflections reflect a taller 
self, a stockier self, or so on. One leaves the mirrored room wondering 
which image is the one closest to “reality.” Then the struggle is to 
suppress the undesirable Other(s) within the Self. Or as discussed 
earlier, when the body becomes the Self’s Other, the flesh and spirit 
resort to fisticuffs to determine which will have more agency.  
 
Convolutions of Victimhood and Agency 
 
Power is conventionally conceived as control that derives from 
physical or mental strength, aggressiveness, or a disproportionate 
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share of resources. However, weakness and passivity can occasionally 
achieve the same ends. For instance, in the earlier discussion of mind-
body splits where a weakened body is viewed as an Other by its Self, 
the body, in its weakened condition, ends up by default exercising 
quite a bit of control and constraint over the frustrated Self. And many 
a spouse will attest to the fact that a passive or lethargic Significant 
Other can, with no use of force, redistribute the bulk of unwanted 
household labor to the Self. So an Other does not need to be in an 
authoritative position to achieve control of a Self; even victims can 
control through sympathy or guilt.  
 
In fact, Others are sometimes othered in partial or contradictory 
ways. While I am mostly discussing Othering as a cultural process, 
Others can be marginalized structurally as well. That is, often cultural 
othering frequently results in structural othering, by which I mean they 
have less access to society’s resources, as evidenced in lower rates of 
education, lower incomes, less control over most institutions. When 
individuals or groups are only (by only I don’t mean to imply that it is 
less damaging) culturally othered, they may be able to muster those 
structural resources and use them to resist their othering or use them 
to create a situation in which they become the Self/Center in relation 
to an Other. For instance, Jews have historically been a group that has 
been victim to cultural othering, through negative stereotyping and 
genocide. However, compared to many other racial-ethnic groups, 
they have to a lesser degree exhibited structural othering. As an ethnic 
group, they have one of the highest median incomes and highest rates 
of education. These resources have better enabled them to survive 
their Othered status and utilize that status to create a relatively 
powerful political State.  
 
The agency attributed to various Others frequently exhibits such 
contrary qualities and ranges on a continuum from subtle and 
subversive to overt and imposing. The Unconscious Other is frequently 
portrayed as inaccessible and repressed. According to Lacan, the 
Unconscious is successfully “fenced off” by language, the Self’s 
defense against the Unconscious (Benstock 1999 or 1988). Buttressing 
this image, Gerald Peters (1998) portrays the Unconscious Other as a 
helpless pathetic character, likening it to “a silent and suspended self 
trapped behind all language, one that sheds tears never seen, one that 
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cries to be let out but is never heard.” However, other portrayals 
depict the Unconscious as imparting discord and agitation as it 
reminds the Self of its lack of unity (Hunsaker 1999). This Unconscious 
exercises its power in a frightening, surreptitious manner, by locating 
holes in the Self’s fortress-like symbolic structure and ferreting its way 
through. Clement (1983:232) describes the Unconscious as a trickster 
who makes us say what we don’t mean, manifested as [Freudian] slips 
of the tongue. “When you use the wrong word, when you say a word 
other than the one you meant to say, it’s not really you who is 
speaking. You are spoken….You are just a conduit for that which has 
decided to escape from within at all costs.”  
 
Similarly, the Marginalized Other’s agency fluctuates from a 
powerless victim to aggressive and furtive. As its name implies, the 
Marginalized Other is commonly portrayed as peripheral, subordinate, 
inferior, oppressed and powerless. This victim-object is created by 
Centers who “othered” it. While many scholars clearly distinguish 
between the Center and Marginalized Other, the oppressor and the 
oppressed, many poststructuralists argue that the Other has agency 
only insofar as it participates in its own denigration (Punday 2003). For 
instance, according to de Beauvoir (1971): “When man makes of 
woman the Other, he may then expect her to manifest deep-seated 
tendencies toward complicity. Thus woman may fail to lay claim to the 
status of subject because she lacks definite resources, because she 
feels the necessary bond that ties her to man regardless of reciprocity, 
and because she is often very well pleased with her role as the Other 
(xxxiii).” Although de Beauvoir thought women were different from 
other oppressed groups because of their widespread internalization of 
negative myths about women, the same internalization of self-hatred 
has been attributed to racial and religious minority groups as well.  
 
However, in a number of aspects, Marginalized Others 
supposedly wield powers similar to the Unconscious. For instance, 
psychologist Wendy Hollway (1993) argues that men’s desire for the 
Other/Mother, which they fear because it induces vulnerability, gives 
women unrecognized power. Hollway argues that men hold ambiguous 
feelings toward vaginal sex. In the vagina men feel engulfed in the 
love of the Other/Mother, but such inundation simultaneously reminds 
them of the power women exert over them. Benstock (1999) argues 
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that Marginalized Others who occupy positions of internal exclusion 
within society—women, blacks, Jews, homosexuals, and others who 
exist at the margins of society—puncture the Self’s defense (as does 
the Unconcious), attempting to defeat its fencing off network. The 
penetrating gaze of these Others threatens the Self, reminding the Self 
of its own internal split, which in turn explains the Self’s need to 
dismiss or repress the Others. Similarly, Anoop Nayak (2005) defines 
racialization as the application of imagined racial “essences” to others. 
The process of racialization, however, affects the identity not only of 
those who are subjected to its power but also those who racialize 
Others. According to Nayak, these Others return to trouble the Self in 
unconscious fantasies and unspoken desires. As an act of projection, 
racialization involves spinning a psychic web of fear, envy, and desire, 
which binds the bodies of racialized others in a silver threat of white 
anxiety. At the very least, because Marginalized Others rarely forget 
their position as an Other, to the extent that they continue to remind 





The Unconscious Other’s propensity to dig its way through the 
defensive language network, the Significant Other’s ability to create 
identity material for or withhold it from the Self, or the body’s 
occasional revolt against the Self’s control could be interpreted as 
forms of resistance to subordination, to a lifeless role. However, more 
salient of late has been the resistance of Marginalized Others, who 
traditionally have held a clearly more peripheral role.  
 
As mentioned earlier, by definition, Marginalized Others are 
subordinate others. However, in recent years they have been accorded 
the possibility of agency sufficient to resist their marginalization and/or 
to counter the dominant Center. Throughout history, Marginalized 
Others have resisted their subordination by telling jokes about or 
mimicking the dominant group (Wasson 1994), grumbling to one 
another, or composing and singing satirical or political songs about 
their oppressors (Linde 1993). But aside from momentarily lightening 
the burden of powerlessness, these tactics rarely transform the 
position of the Marginalized Other.  
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More decisively, Marginalized Others resist and confront 
othering by developing a tolerance for contradictions (Bromley 2000, 
Rosaldo 1989) or by using the material from which they were 
constructed to mount a campaign to privilege the characteristics of the 
Others. For instance, Stone (2002) argues that the marginalized 
position is not simply one of deprivation, but additionally is an 
entryway to realms of knowledge and feeling that the dominant culture 
hides or denies. Stone quotes author Toni Morrison who wrote that her 
marginalized position as a black person and as a woman gave her 
“access to a range of emotions and perceptions that were unavailable 
to people who were neither” (p. 71).  
 
According to narrative scholar Zaborowska (1995), this 
bicultural, in-between identity “may be the only kind capable of 
engaging in intercultural dialogue and of remaking the host culture.” 
Although Lentin (2004) writes that Irish migrant women remain as 
“barbarian[s] beyond the pale of civilization, forever consigned to play 
the role of the ontological, political, economic and cultural other,” she 
also argues that their stories are not only the product of negation and 
damage but also of resistance and survival.  
 
Such a vantage point is increasingly being shared in written 
narratives and memoirs, such as through the Personal Narratives 
Group (1989) headquartered in Minnesota. PNG supports this strategy 
based on the belief that “nondominant social groups (women in 
general, racially or ethnically oppressed people, lower-class people, 
lesbians) are often particularly effective sources of counterhegemonic 
insight because they expose the dominant ideology as particularist 
rather than universal, and because they reveal the reality of a life that 
defies or contradicts the rules.” Fand (1999) claims that Others have 
the power to change the very language and social structures that 
constituted them in the first place, so that, for instance, women 
formed from patriarchal influences may nevertheless expose the 
contradictions embedded in patriarchal discourse and institutions and 
create a new dynamic between power “centers” and their “margins.”  
 
To illustrate, Marginalized Others are often created as opposites 
of Selves, for instance, men as rational, women as emotional. Literary 
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scholar Helen Buss (2002) argues that in choosing to write an 
autobiography, women must enter the discourse of man. In seeking 
cultural authority, they must portray an individualist selfhood attuned 
to personal achievement, when they really wish to tell a story 
characterized by absence, silence, vulnerability, immanence, 
interpenetration, one that is nonlogocentric, unpredictable, and 
childish. By Lacanian definition, many of these attributes are the very 
ones suppressed by the male child to enter the world of the adult, to 
leave the imaginary realm for the symbolic. Similarly, literary scholar 
Paul Eakin (1990) mentions that in the study of autobiographical 
writing, women’s and men’s autobiographical styles are distinguished 
by binary characteristics: women’s as collective, relational, and 
nonlinear and discontinuous, while men’s style is individualistic, 
autonomous, and linear. Ironically, these same dichotomies frequently 
are used to distinguish racial minority values and orientations from 
those of White Europeans. That is, racial-ethnic minorities are often 
said to be oriented to the collective over the individual, to nonlinear 
over linear thinking, to interdependence over independence (Stone 
1988, for instance).  
 
However, in the past decade or so, Russian philosopher Mikhail 
Bahktin’s work on cultural and literary theory has risen to the forefront 
in literary analysis. His concepts of “dialogism” and “heteroglossia” are 
particularly utilized in discussions of Others, as Bahktin argues that the 
representation of multiple voices is essential to authenticity. Fand 
(1999) describes Bahktin’s concept of dialogism as privileging female 
characteristics over male. That is, Bahktin’s dialogism emphasizes 
relating and negotiating (rather than isolating and polarizing 
positions), responding to concrete particulars (rather than to abstract 
principles), and intuitive thinking (rather than linear thinking). 
Although such strategies continue to propagate problematic dualisms, 
by turning these dualisms on their head, Marginalized Others, in a 
backhanded way, argue that women and people of color are deeper 
and more layered than men and Whites, whose characteristics are by 
implication unilayered and egocentric.  
 
One final way of resisting Otherhood is to transform an Other 
into a Self. This is currently happening in the literature on animal-
human relationships. Generally, animals, if addressed at all, have been 
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treated as groups, or perhaps as individual pets, subordinate and 
marginal to humans. At best they have been viewed, as mentioned 
above, as Nonhuman Others. Work by Alger & Alger (1997), Irvine 
(2004), and Sanders & Arluke (1993) has argued that animals are at 
least “subjective Others” and perhaps have Selves. To achieve this 
end, these scholars do away with the linguistic foundation of the Self 
that is found in Lacan and Mead and instead use a more emotive, 
senses-based Self,4 arguing that what is minimally needed for a Self 
are four facets (which they derive from psychologist William James’ 
[1890] work): a sense of agency (self-willed or self-controlled action), 
a sense of coherence (that is, a sense of being a physical whole), a 
sense of affectivity (feelings), and a sense of self-history (memory).5  
 
Current and Future Research  
 
Little empirical research incorporates the concepts of the Other. 
Partial explanation for this absence lies in the fact that the conceptions 
are often difficult, if not impossible, to measure. For instance, being 
that the Unconscious Other is, as its name implies, unconscious, it is 
an Other that is merely speculative. The Self has no ability to access 
the Unconscious, let alone measure it. Like a god, its existence can’t 
be proven. Nevertheless, the belief that it might exist may exert 
measurable influence on social behavior. That is, an individual may 
avoid inebriation or a drug-induced high for fear that such a state may 
weaken the Self’s defenses and his or her repressed thoughts and 
emotions may embarrassingly leak out, bequeathing to other people 
more information about him/her than s/he has about her/himself. To 
what extent does belief in the Unconscious Other succeed in controlling 
or motivating behavior and what types of behaviors are more 
susceptible to this belief? These may be more fruitful questions for 
future research.  
 
One example of research that puts a twist on Lacan’s 
Unconscious Other is social psychologist Phillip Shon’s (2002) 
discussion of mass murder by young white youth, as in the 1999 
Columbine murders. Shon adopts Bracher’s (1995) terminology, which 
defines Lacan’s Other as the Self’s “internalized ultimate authority.” 
Shon then suggests that these youth desire the Desire of the Other. 
However, in this case the Other has been externalized; the U.S. 
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government & country become the Other, the ultimate authority, 
whom the youth hope desires them. In today’s multicultural society, 
these white youth think this authority now desires minorities, as 
evidenced in enforcement of preference laws, such as affirmative 
action, hate crimes statues, gender equity, etc. It is the classic Cain 
and Abel story; the jealous youth kill the Other’s object of desire.  
 
Some sociological research has included the Generalized Other. 
Himsel & Goldberg (2003), for instance, studied marital satisfaction in 
regard to household division of labor. They found that satisfaction with 
the distribution of household labor varied according to which reference 
wives and husbands chose for comparison. Wives tended to compare 
their situation to their peers’, while husbands frequently compared 
chore distribution to their mothers’ situations. When husbands 
compared themselves to their wives, they often acknowledged that 
their wives assumed a greater share of family work. However, Himsel 
& Goldberg also found that a number of men, particularly those in 
dual-earner marriages, invoked for comparison not a real person but 
rather a Generalized Other, a putative typical dad, who performed less 
family work than they did. These husbands described an image of a 
Generalized Other whose meager contributions to family work 
enhanced their own relative involvement. Similarly, Gager’s (1998) 
study on father involvement—although it did not apply the term 
“Generalized Other”--found that dads often generated an image of a 
“do-nothing dad” to whom they would favorably compare. 
 
Scott’s (2004) study on shyness uses both the Generalized 
Other and what I have called the Meiotic Self. Scott understands 
shyness as a dialogue between the I and the Me of Mead’s social self 
(what I have termed the basal Meiotic Self). She distinguishes 
between embarrassment, which is a reaction of acute self-
consciousness about a faux pas that has already occurred, and 
shyness, which is anticipatory anxiety about imagined or expected 
blunders. According to Scott, shyness is caused by monitoring one’s 
own action compared to a generalized image of what she calls the 
“competent other,” an estimation of how socially skilled others are in a 
particular social situation.  
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The Generalized Other was conceived by Mead as an organized 
community or social group that gives rise to a communal attitude 
about aspects of common social activity. This communal attitude must 
be taken up by the Self in order to fully develop. In doing so, the 
community exercises social control over the conduct of its individuals. 
Mead’s concept seems to assume that the Self takes up these social 
attitudes “correctly;” that is, there is little room for Mead’s Self to 
create a Generalized Other that is conducive to the Self’s desires. Yet 
the above described research suggests that individuals may tweak the 
Generalized Other to fit their needs and that the individual may rely on 
faulty information to concoct a Generalized Other. In both cases, the 
Generalized Other is a dynamic Other that may change over the 
course of one’s lifetime, reflecting shifting social structures and 
cultural mores.  
 
This leads to potential research questions: Where did the fathers 
obtain the information that comprised their Generalized Other? From 
friends/peers who say they do less (but perhaps do more and don’t 
want to admit it)? Do these fathers seek out other husbands who do 
less in order to make themselves look better? Hypothetically, if a Self 
perceives that the general attitude about extramarital affairs, let’s say, 
is conservative but then hears a news report that extramarital affairs 
are increasing or finds that several friends are partaking in such 
affairs, does such information about what the Generalized Other is 
doing or thinking allow the Self to now consider what he/she might not 
have considered and how long would that time-lag be? How do 
persons choose among competing Generalized Others?  
 
Wiener & Rosenwald’s (1993) work on diaries incorporates the 
concept of multiples selves (which I sorted under Meiotic Self). The 
authors point out that diarists may keep several diaries reflecting 
different selves, multiple selves, which can then confront one another. 
Thus, the diary performs a “mirror” function, making Self into an Other 
or observing oneself as an object.  
 
By writing about oneself in the diary one creates a picture of the 
self as a whole. One may also become aware of the self as 
divided into subject and object, the experiencer and the 
observer of experience. Beyond the transitional object function 
of the diary, which serves to help the self differentiate from 
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others, this mirror function of the diary helps to distinguish not 
only the ‘me’ from the ‘not-me’; it also embodies the division 
between ‘I, the subject’ and ‘me, the object’ of reflection. (p. 
44)  
 
Similarly, Brendan Stone’s (2006) analysis of the diaries of two 
psychotic patients, shows that the diary functioned as the Other that 
aided the patient in rebuilding its shattered Self, to regain a voice that 
had been stolen, to reclaim an identity by dialoging with its Other.  
 
Such research could go further in asking what circumstances are 
more likely to produce, or what types of people are more likely to 
adopt, a strategy of multiple selves. Sennett & Cobb’s writing 
(mentioned above) suggests that situations of alienation (in their case, 
workplace situations) may either impose or cause a Self to adopt a 
strategy of self-othering, but one can easily imagine other alienating 
experiences (see, for example, Rayson’s (1999) work on Japanese-
American women’s experience in wartime relocation centers, where 
she says their “split identity” was exacerbated), such as where one is 
situated in the midst of a new Generalized Other or in cases of rape or 
domestic abuse, where dividing, or separating from, the Self would be 
a logical coping mechanism.  
 
In regard to the Self as composed of mind and body, future 
research opportunities abound. Pregnancy and paralysis have always 
existed as situations that have the potential to alienate body from 
mind, but the aging of the babyboomers, increased organ transplants 
(most recently the face) and proliferating war injuries all provide a 
plethora of situations where the Self may feel othered by its body. 
Cases of amnesia provide instances where bodily dysfunctions or 
traumas obliterate a Self, require Significant Others to put Humpty-
Dumpty’s Self back together again, but also paradoxically potentially 
provide opportunities to construct new Selves.  
 
The Other that has garnered a fair amount of research is the 
Significant Other. Some of that research has focused on how 
professionals can play the role of Significant Other for various types of 
“clients.” For instance, Miller (1996) approaches the research 
interviewer as the Significant Other; in this case, Miller himself was the 
Interviewer/Other. Miller visualized the interviewer as playing the 
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“Thou” as in Buber’s I and Thou. He found that many of the 
respondents interviewed just wished to be heard out, to be listened to 
and understood by an attentive other. However, he also concluded 
that the Self and Other in this relationship are mutually acting as 
Others for one another. The interviewer or therapist who intends to be 
the Other, acting as a sounding board for a Self, may find, perhaps 
unwittingly, that s/he is gradually being changed by the other person. 
Similarly, Hurvitz’s (1979) work on family therapy argued that in order 
to be effective, therapists needed to become significant others to their 
clients.  
 
Another set of research on Significant Others focuses on daily 
dyadic relationships. Ogle & Damhorst (2003), for example, looked at 
mothers and daughters as dyadic pairs, referring to each other as the 
“dyadic other.” Specifically, the authors studied this relationship in 
reference to dieting behavior. They found that mothers and daughters 
described a process in which they used their perceptions about the 
dyadic other and their relationship with that other to guide their body- 
and diet-related interactions. Each attempted to exert control over 
their interactions. However, although both mothers and daughters 
acted as diet supporters to one another, only mothers served as 
conscious socializers and safety supervisors.  
 
A growing “unform” of autobiography combines both the 
Significant Other and Self as Other (Meiotic Self). Autothanatography 
is essentially a memoir about dying, in which the Other, frequently 
familial, provides a map of a Self (Eakin 1990). In this death narrative, 
the dying person incorporates his/her own perspective on his/her own 
bodily deterioration along with the narratives of Significant Others 
about the dying person. According to Susanna Egan (undated), 
autothanotography reverses the usual  
 
pattern of autobiography; it covers a brief period of time and a 
single main experience, and involves other people than the 
dying self often in a dialogue of shared experience….Second, 
autothanatography takes on the whole business of the body…. 
Facing death, the body forces reversal of the normal trajectories 
of autobiography. Miller [1994], again, has described the 
forward-looking story about the "becoming" of a life and 
describes autothanatography as an "UNbecoming."  
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Recent memoirs that exemplify autothanatography include Eric 
Michael’s (1997) Unbecoming, Christina Middlebrook’s (1996) Seeing 
the Crab: A Memoir of Dying, and Miller’s (1996) Bequest and 
Betrayal: Memoirs of a parent’s death. This form of memoir epitomizes 
the social creation of the Self, and although not research, it raises 
questions with potential for qualitative research. How much of one’s 
Self is so to speak “vaulted” in Significant Others? And, as Significant 
Others die, do they forever take with them, and hence render 
inaccessible, knowledge of another’s Self? One then might imagine a 
young person whose mother dies and is no longer available to answer 
questions such as “Did I do such and such when I was young?” “Did I 
display a certain characteristic as a child?” “Tell me the story about….” 
However, even as one reaches late life, with each passing of family 
members and friends, how might the remaining elder feel less a Self, 
less storied? How might that impact his/her own identity and will to 
live? Even without death, the unity or fullness of the Self may also 
suffer during geographical transitions, as when one moves to a new 
job or neighborhood, leaving behind people who knew them best and 
longest and making friends with people who don’t know one’s past nor 
care to ask. To what extent does the death or disappearance of the 
Significant Others leave the Self incomplete or, on the other hand, 
offer opportunities to create new Selves?  
 
Finally, I have already discussed that research is being 
conducted on Nonhuman Others. So far, that research is focused on 
animals, primarily pets and companion animals such as cats and dogs. 
It is conceivable that this will eventually expand to other animals, 
particularly those that have already been studied by biologists and 
naturalists.  
 
In short, I have tried to articulate and illustrate the roles and 
agency of the various Others that are usually subsidiary characters in 
the story of the Self. The literature on Selves easily allows individuals 
to keep rewriting their Selves with each new experience, each new 
disruption. But what about the Other? Its assumed subordination to, or 
at least secondary importance to, the Self produces and perpetuates a 
concept of Others that is somewhat stagnant. In fact, Others intersect, 
play multiple roles, and shift amoebically as they exist in a state of 
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dynamic tension with the Self. A new generation of research and 
narrative focusing on the Other could enlighten and enliven the role of 
Others and Selves in the creation and maintenance of both social 
identities and interaction.  
 
Acknowledgements: Thanks to Norm Denzin, James A. Holstein, Robert A. 




1. I do not intend to imply here that Others and Selves are separate entities 
nor that Others have no Selves. Most Others do have Selves, though 
they often go unrecognized or undervalued.  
2. One early noteworthy exception to the benevolent Other was Jose Ortega y 
Gasset’s (1956) notion of a malevolent Other whose goal was to 
submerge the Self within it. Ortega referred to this as “alteration.” He 
is discussed in Perinbanayagam (1985) as well. 
3. One has to wonder whether the concept of discrete ego boundaries and 
their necessity for psychic health would even arise in societies not 
based on private property. Holstein & Gubrium (2000:11) relay the 
story of a Western researcher who lived with the Akaramas, a tribe in 
Peru. The Akaramas had no concept of the “individual;” group identity 
was paramount. Even upon death, a person’s absence seemed to go 
unnoticed. Eventually, the researcher left the field because he felt his 
distinct “me” was being eradicated. However, the psychoanalytic and 
social theory that focuses on the Other arose in societies highly 
defined by the concept of property and privileging male ways of 
relating, so I proceed on that premise.  
4. One could still argue that Lacan’s creation of the Self could accommodate a 
less language-based construction of Self, as he argues that the 
psychological needs of Desire, Lack and Absence underlie human 
interaction. Language enters later as a human symbolic register that is 
representative of these needs.  
5. While I personally would be easily convinced that animals have a Self, I 
believe this search for the “minimal Self” poses some problems. The 
arguments proffered are sometimes more about the humans involved 
in the human-animal interaction than they are about the animals. For 
instance, Irvine argues that humans seek relationships with animals 
and are concerned about animal well-being, that human-animal 
interaction increases in complexity over time, that animals act as 
“social facilitators,” and that people name animals. Although this is 
only part of Irvine’s evidence, she argues that these behaviors are 
evidence that animals “give off” (as in Goffman’s (1959) “impressions 
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given off”) a sense of Self or subjectivity. That may be the case, but it 
is also possible that those same human behaviors may be projections 
of human subjectivity onto animals because that’s how humans are 
accustomed to interacting. Humans are known to name and talk to 
dolls and stuffed animals and plants (Sometimes I even feel I’m 
talking to a wall!). Sometimes they paint faces on and name inanimate 
objects. Note the case of “Wilson” in the film The Castaway, in which 
the main character, played by Tom Hanks, stranded for years on a 
deserted island bestows a Self upon a volleyball, who becomes a 
needed companion for Hanks. Wilson’s demise probably brought tears 
to many an eye or a lump to the throat, but I don’t think many would 
argue that Wilson had a Self or sense of subjectivity. In addition, the 
search for a minimal Self could foreseeably have us spelunking into 
the womb. At which point does a human (or animal) have the 
beginnings of a Self? Given that we now know that fetuses hear and 
feel in the womb and many (anal) parents now talk to, play music for, 
and practice math skills with their intrauterine baby, we may 
eventually hear arguments for a Prenatal Self. Is this somewhat akin 
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